Edgar Salomon- Bajxac v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-6-2014 
Edgar Salomon- Bajxac v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Edgar Salomon- Bajxac v. Attorney General United States" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 257. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/257 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3711 
___________ 
 
EDGAR ORACIO SALOMON-BAJXAC, 
      Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
       Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-380-845) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2014 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 7, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Edgar Salomon-Bajxac petitions for review of a final order of removal 
issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons detailed below, we 
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will deny the petition for review.   
 Salomon-Bajxac is a citizen of Guatemala.  In 2010, the Department of Homeland 
Security charged him with being removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien 
present without being admitted.  Salomon-Bajxac conceded removability but applied for 
cancellation of removal.  The government contended that Salomon-Bajxac had 
committed a crime involving moral turpitude — he was convicted in 2003 in New Jersey 
state court of third-degree aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer in violation of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) — which rendered him ineligible for cancellation of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 
 The Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed with the government, denied Salomon-
Bajxac’s application for cancellation of removal, and ordered him removed.  Salomon-
Bajxac appealed to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal.  Salomon-Bajxac then filed a 
timely petition for review to this Court.  
 We have jurisdiction over Salomon-Bajxac’s petition for review pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a).  The Court reviews the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, except 
when Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), requires the 
Court to defer to the BIA.  Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008).  
The Court defers, under Chevron, “to the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude,” and to its 
“determination that a certain crime involves moral turpitude.”  Id. (quotation marks, 
citation omitted).   
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 The BIA did not err here.  We have explained that “the hallmark of moral 
turpitude is a reprehensible act with an appreciable level of consciousness or 
deliberation.”  Totimeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks, 
alterations omitted).  Typically, in determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude, 
we employ a “categorical approach” that “focus[es] on the underlying criminal statute 
rather than the alien’s specific act.”  Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(quotation marks omitted).  Under that approach, a criminal statute categorically involves 
moral turpitude “only if all of the conduct [the statute] prohibits is turpitudinous.”  
Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, if the statute is 
“divisible” — that is, it “covers both turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous acts” — we turn 
to a modified categorical approach, and “look to the record of conviction to determine 
whether the alien was convicted under [a] part of the statute defining a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”  Id.   
 In Partyka, we applied this analysis to the very statute at issue here, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a), and concluded that it covers both turpitudinous and nonturpitudinous 
conduct.  More specifically, the statute provides that an individual is guilty of aggravated 
assault if he “[c]ommits a simple assault as defined in subsection a. (1), (2) or (3) of this 
section upon . . . [a]ny law enforcement officer.”  § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a).  Subsections (1), 
(2), and (3), meanwhile, state that a person is guilty of assault if he “(1) [a]ttempts to 
cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2) 
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[n]egligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or (3) [a]ttempts by 
physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”  N.J. Ann. 
Stat. § 2C:12-1(a).  We then concluded that negligent assault, as proscribed by § 2C:12-
1(a)(2), is not turpitudinous, while purposeful, knowing, or reckless assault, as proscribed 
by § 2C:12-1(a)(1), does involve moral turpitude.  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 416.
1
  We 
therefore ruled that in assessing whether convictions under § 2C:12-1(b)(5)(a) qualify as 
crimes involving moral turpitude, it is necessary to use the modified categorical approach 
to determine which subsection of § 2C:12-1(a) the alien violated.  See id.  We will thus 
employ that approach here. 
 In applying the modified categorical approach, we may review “the indictment, 
plea, verdict, and sentence.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Here, the indictment 
specifically alleges that Salomon-Bajxac “purposely did attempt to cause bodily injury to 
and/or purposely, knowingly or recklessly did cause bodily injury to Detective Edward 
Rivera.”2  Thus, the record of conviction unequivocally shows that Salomon-Bajxac 
violated § 2C:12-1(a)(1); this subsection, we concluded in Partyka, involves moral 
turpitude.  See id.; see also Totimeh, 666 F.3d at 114 (noting that moral turpitude may 
                                              
 
1
 In Partyka, we noted that aggravated assault on a law-enforcement officer is a 
crime of the third degree if the officer suffers a bodily injury, and because petitioner in 
that case pleaded guilty to third-degree aggravated assault — like Salomon-Bajxac did 
here — he could not dispute that his assault caused injury.  See Partyka, 417 F.3d at 412. 
 
2
 The fact that the indictment (like § 2C:12-1(a)(1)) includes criminal attempt is of 
no consequence.  As the Court observed in Partyka, “[t]he attempts described in 
subsection (a)(1) and (3) require specific intent,” and thus involve the requisite state of 
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inhere in crimes committed recklessly); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 90 (3d Cir. 
2004) (accepting legal standard for crimes of moral turpitude that the BIA applied here); 
In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 673 (BIA 1988) (concluding that similar crime 
involved moral turpitude).  Therefore, the BIA did not err in concluding that Salomon-
Bajxac was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, which rendered him 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.
3
   
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
mind for a crime involving moral turpitude.  417 F.3d at 412 n.3. 
 
3
 Salomon-Bajxac also complains that the BIA did not address his cancellation-of-
removal application on the merits.  Contrary to his argument, the BIA’s analysis was 
perfectly permissible — “agencies are not required to make findings on issues the 
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”  INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 
U.S. 24, 25 (1976). 
